Pilots' use of a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS 2) in simulated air carrier operations. Volume 1: Methodology, summary and conclusions by Billings, Charles E. et al.
NASA Technical Memorandum 100094
Pilots' Use of a Traffic Alert and
Collision-Avoidance System
(TCAS II)in Simulated Air
Carrier Operations
Volume I: Methodology, Summary,
and Conclusions
Sheryl L. Chappell and Charles E.Billings, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California
Barry C. Scott, Federal Aviation Administration, Moffett Field, California
Robert J. Tuttell, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
M. Christine Olsen, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California
Thomas E. Kozon, Sterling Software Corporation, Palo Alto, California
January 1989
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, Califomia 94035
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19890008666 2020-03-20T03:25:50+00:00Z
q ||"
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume I: Methodology, Summary, and Conclusions
Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................
Summary ........................................................................................................................................
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................
Methodology ..................................................................................................................................
Subjects ..................................................................................................................................
Experimental Design .......................................................................... , ...................................
Equipment ..............................................................................................................................
TCAS II .........................................................................................................................
Simulation ......................................................................................................................
Procedures ..............................................................................................................................
Training ..........................................................................................................................
Experimental flights .......................................................................................................
Scenarios ........................................................................................................................
Data collection ...............................................................................................................
Performance measures ....................................................................................................
Instrumentation ...............................................................................................................
Occurrences ....................................................................................................................
Results: Organized by Research Questions (paraphrased)
1. Did TCAS improve safety? .....................................................................................
2. Were pilots able to initiate avoidance maneuvers promptly? ..................................
3. Did pilots respond correctly to maneuver advisories? .............................................
4. Were pilots able to attain safe separation with
minimal impact on air traffic control? ...................................................................
5. Did pilots with more information respond differently? ...........................................
6. Were pilots able to use TCAS without a traffic display? ........................................
7. Did pilots respond differently to different advisories? ............................................
8. Did pilots alter flight path in response to preventive advisories? ...........................
9. Were pilots with more traffic information more likely
to detect intruders visually? ..................................................................................
10. Did pilots respond differently to advisories when they
had visually acquired an intruder? ........................................................................
11. Did the level of traffic information affect responses
differently as a function of visual acquisition? .....................................................
12. Did pilots respond differently to maneuver advisories
under instrument meteorological conditions? ........................................................
13. Were responses in IMC affected by level of information? ...................................
PRECED_G
vii
1
2
3
3
3
4
4
7
8
8
8
8
10
10
10
11
12
13
15
15
15
17
17
18
18
19
19
19
19
PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
iii
• i
_,.._.,o,I N'[[N TIONALLt 8LA_K
14. Did pilots hesitate or respond incorrectly to maneuver
advisories that required crossing intruder's altitude? ............................................
15. Did visual acquisition affect performance of crossing
maneuvers? ............................................................................................................
16. Did level of traffic information affect performance of
crossing maneuvers? .............................................................................................
17. Were responses affected by aircraft flight attitude?
Did this vary with level of traffic information? ....................................................
18. Did response times improve with experience or degrade with fatigue? ................
19. Did TCAS and level of information affect cockpit workload? .............................
20. How did pilots respond to a "TCAS invalid" message? .......................................
21. Did pilots maneuver prior to maneuver advisories? ..............................................
22. How did evasive maneuvers differ with and without TCAS? ...............................
23. Were there individual differences in TCAS responses? ........................................
24. Were there differences between captains and first officers? ..................................
25. Did flight experience differ across conditions? .....................................................
26. Did display condition affect evaluation of the simulation? ...................................
27. How did pilots subjectively evaluate the TCAS? ..................................................
28. Did pilots estimate their response times accurately? .............................................
29. How did pilots use the traffic display switch (condition 3)? ................................
30. How did pilots use the range and altitude functions (condition 4)? ......................
Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................................
Summary of Results ................ ......................................................................................................
References ................................................... ... ....... . ........................................................................
2O
20
20
21
22
22
22
23
24
24
24
25
25
25
25
25
26
27
27
28
Tables
1. Alert characteristics of the TCAS in this experiment ...............................................
2. Display conditions for NASA/FAA TCAS simulation .............................................
3. TCAS experiment flight schedules ...........................................................................
4. Number of traffic and resolution advisories by level
of traffic information .............................. .................................................... :...........
5. TCAS alerts observed during line flying ....... ...........................................................
6. Visual detection of traffic vs level of information ...................................................
7. Mean time to attain commanded vertical velocity ....................................................
8. Response times vs level of information and crossing requirement ..........................
9. RMS vertical velocity error vs crossing maneuvers .................................................
10. Use of the horizontal display range options ............................................................
11. Use of the vertical range options .............................................................................
6
7
9
11
12
18
19
21
21
26
26
iv
Figures
1. Cockpit displays utilized in the TCAS experiment ..................................................
a. Minimal TCAS display (condition 2) ...............................................................
b. TCAS with traffic display only during conflicts (condition 3) .........................
c. TCAS with continuous traffic display (condition 4) .........................................
2. Distribution of response times to TCAS corrective resolution advisories ................
3. Altitude changes from level flight in response to
corrective resolution advisories .............................................. , ...............................
4. Altitude changes from level flight following
preventive resolution advisories .............................................................................
5
5
5
5
14
16
16
Volume H: Appendices
Summary
A1. TCAS Experiment: Handbook for Air Carders and Flight Crews
A2. Flight Plan and Aircraft Load Data
B. Subject Flight Time Questionnaire
C. TCAS Experimental Design
D1. TCAS Training Narrative for condition 2
D2. TCAS Training Narrative for condition 3
D3. TCAS Training Narrative for condition 4
E. Description of Simulation Computer Integration
F. Subject Information Form
G. Experimenter Checklist and Subject Briefing Outline
H. Quiz on TCAS, Used During Training
I. TCAS Airplane Flight Manual Supplement
J. Forecast and Actual Weather
K. Air Traffic Control Script
L. Encounters Used in the TCAS Experiment
M. Data Forms Used by Observers
N. Workload Rating Scales
O. TCAS Post-Flight Questionnaires
P. Verbal Debriefing of Subjects
Q. Human Factors of the TCAS II Collision-Avoidance System:
Maneuvers Based on Resolution Alerts
R. Use of the TCAS Traffic Advisory Display for Evasive Maneuvering
S. Post-Flight Questionnaire Results
I-| I
PILOTS' USE OF A TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION-AVOIDANCE
SYSTEM (TCAS H) IN SIMULATED AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
Volume I: Methodology, Summary, and Conclusions
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In response to requests from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the air carrier industry,
NASA Ames Research Center and FAA investigators designed and carried out an experiment to evalu-
ate the use by air cartier pilots of traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS II) equipment
(referred to hereafter as TCAS) during simulated line operations.
Approach
This study utilized full-mission simulations of eight air carrier flights. Sixteen three-person airline
flight crews currently flying Boeing 727 aircraft served as subjects. Each crew flew eight flight seg-
ments during a 10-hr simulated duty day. They were exposed to potential and actual conflicts with
other aircraft under daylight conditions of varying visibility, and twilight or night ambient illumination.
Each crew flew the simulation under one of four conditions: (I) a control condition without TCAS
equipment; (2) a minimal TCAS configuration without a display of conflicting traffic; (3) a TCAS with
a display on which traffic was presented only when a conflict occurred; and (4) a TCAS with a full-
time display of traffic in the vicinity of the 727. The latter two conditions arc approximately
equivalent to display configurations being utilized in the TCAS limited installation program scheduled
to begin on three U.S. air carriers early in 1988.
The crews were given aircraft differences training, simulator familiarization, and instruction in the use
of the TCAS equipment to which they were assigned on the day before their experimental flights. The
experiment day covered approximately 10 hr of duty; eight segments were flown on a schedule which
involved approximately 6 hr of flight (scheduled block time 6:48). All crews flew identical segments
and all were exposed to the same conflicting aircraft under similar conditions. All flights were con-
ducted in a simulated, full-air-traffic-control environment.
Digital, audio, and video data were recorded, reduced, and subjected to graphical and statistical ana-
lyses. The results are briefly summarized here; the body of the report contains a detailed description of
the findings.
Findings
This study was one of several (see references) designed to assess the impact of TCAS. An implicit
question in all of these studies has been whether TCAS could be demonstrated to have a beneficial
effect on the safety of aircraft operations, as measured by the ability of pilots of TCAS-equipped air-
craft to avoid serious traffic conflicts in simulated line operations.
In this experiment, there was a significant difference between non-TCAS and TCAS crews with respect
to outcomes of the conflicts to which all were exposed. Without TCAS, in four instances minimum
separation between aircraft was less than 1000 ft horizontal and 200 ft vertical simultaneously during
32 flight segments; in one case, minimum separation was less than 500 ft horizontal and 100 ft verti-
cal. With TCAS, there were no instances in 96 flight segments in which minimum aircraft separation
was less than 1000 ft horizontally and 200 ft vertically. Maneuvers initiated in response to TCAS
commands increased vertical separation between conflicting aircraft in 37 of 40 cases in which a
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detailed outcome analysis was performed. (1 and 4) 1 (Also see appendix Q)
Flight crew response times were well within the 5 sec allocated by the TCAS logic; in only one of 57
advisories requiring a maneuver was this limit exceeded (by 2 sec). The average response time was
1.9 sec. All maneuvers were in the commanded direction. (2 and 3)
Perceived workload was evaluated by each crew member afte r each flight. As has been the case in
most previous studies, crewmembers rated their workload as significantly higher when they were con-
trolling the aircraft. Differences in workload between control (non-TCAS) and TCAS conditions were
not significant; but the differences for first officers approached significance, condition 3 being rated by
them as involving the lowest and condition 4 the highest workload. (19)
Pilots with TCAS tended to exceed the altitude changes required by the TCAS logic; the average
required change was 512 ft, the average observed change was 652 ft. In 9 of 19 cases, pilots changed
altitude unnecessarily, by an average of 206 It, when only a preventive (no altitude change) advisory
was presented by the equipment. (3, 4, and 8)
There were no differences in response times to maneuver advisories as a function of-the amount of
traffic information available; but crews without the planform display of traffic (condition 2) tended to
maneuver slightly more abruptly, with greater peak rates of climb or descent, when a resolution
advisory was presented. (5 and 6)
Pilots initiated avoidance maneuvers more promptly when in a climb or descent than when in level
flight. They attained the commanded rates of climb or descent most promptly when reducing their rate
of descent, slightly less promptly when entering a climb, even less promptly when entering a descent,
and least promptly when reducing their rate of climb. (7 and 17)
The probability of visual acquisition of conflicting aircraft did not vary as a function either of the pres-
ence of TCAS or of the information level within TCAS conditions. (9)
The TCAS operating procedures prescribed in this experiment stated that pilots were permitted to
maneuver without regard to TCAS commands when the conflicting aircraft was identified visually.
Subject pilots were instructed, however, that such maneuvers may invalidate the ability of TCAS to
assist in conflict resolution. No differences were observed in pilot behavior as a function of visual
acquisition of conflicting traffic, except that pilots under condition 3 took longer to establish com-
manded rates of climb or descent when the traffic was in view (as they had the right to do under these
rules). (10 and 11) Pilots were as prompt to respond under ins_ent as under visual meteorological
conditions, and there were no measured differences in their responses. (12 and 13)
The TCAS logic may command a maneuver toward another aircraft's present altitude when one or both
aircraft are climbing or descending; this was announced in the auditory message that accompanies a
resolution advisory, and crews were given specific instruction with regard to these crossing maneuvers.
There has been concern that such maneuvers might be worrisome to pilots; however, crossing
maneuvers were specifically examined in this study. It was found that pilots responded significantly
more slowly to crossing maneuvers, though average response times were still well within the 5 sec
limit. Peak vertical velocities were also higher in crossing maneuvers, and the amount of altitude
change during such maneuvers was significantly greater. (14) Visual acquisition of conflicting traffic
did not affect these responses. (15) The amount of information available, however, did affect response
times in crossing maneuvers; pilots without a planform display responded most quickly (condition 2),
tThenumbers inparenthesesreferto specificnmabered researchquestionsintheResultssection.Questions18,20,25,29,and 30 ane
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and those with information only during conflicts (condition 3) least rapidly, though within the TCAS
limits. (16)
Pilots understood that they were not to maneuver on the basis of information on the traffic displays
unless they had visually acquired the target--that the information was designed to assist them to acquire
conflicting traffic visually, and that anticipatory maneuvers might invalidate the TCAS logic. Nonethe-
less, there were 14 instances in which pilots with traffic displays (conditions 3 and 4) initiated an
avoidance maneuver based on the information shown on their displays, 7 under each condition. Seven
of the 8 crews exposed to these two conditions made such maneuvers. Three of five turn maneuvers
were initiated to avoid unseen mode A targets. (21)
Pilots exposed to the non-TCAS condition took evasive action in 17 of 24 cases in which conflicting
traffic was sighted; in nine cases, a pitch change was used, and in eight, a turn was initiated. Their
maneuvers tended to be less abrupt than those of TCAS-equipped crews, as would be expected since
the non-TCAS crews maneuvered only enough to insure visual separation. They were not able to see,
and thus to maneuver to avoid, nine other of the 33 conflicting aircraft that would have triggered a
resolution advisory, however. (22)
Pronounced idiosyncratic differences were observed in the performance of evasive maneuvers with
respect to response time, time to attain commanded rates of altitude change, vertical velocity overshoot,
and time to complete a return to previous altitude or state. (23) There were no systematic performance
differences between captains and first officers, however, nor did responses to debriefing questionnaires
differ as a function of crew position. (24)
Pilots were asked during debriefings to estimate their average response times to TCAS maneuver
advisories. Their estimates were nearly twice as long as their average measured response times. (28)
They were also asked to evaluate the simulation, and those exposed to conditions 2, 3 and 4 were
asked to evaluate the effectiveness of the TCAS equipment. There were few statistically significant
differences across conditions. (26 and 27)
Summary
Under the conditions of this simulation experiment, TCAS II was entirely effective in ameliorating the
seriousness of traffic conflicts. The amount of information on the location of other air traffic had little
effect on the responses of the flight crews to TCAS resolution advisories; measured responses were
equally effective in crew members having no information, limited information, or full information
regarding traffic in their immediate surround.
Some pilots used the information provided on the planform displays of conflicting traffic to maneuver
in advance of a maneuver advisory, despite instructions not to do so. While ultimate responsibility for
safety of flight rests with the pilot in command, this matter must be emphasized in TCAS training; but
it must be borne in mind that pilots will use all of the information available to them to ensure safety of
flight.
Three turning maneuvers were made to avoid unseen mode A (non-altitude reporting) targets. Crew
comments during these maneuvers indicated that they were aware that they had been instructed not to
make such maneuvers, but that they were also keenly aware that they would not receive maneuver
advisories on mode A traffic. The uncertainty caused by incomplete information about such targets
suggests the need for mode C transponding equipment in all aircraft likely to interact with TCAS-
equipped aircraft, especially in terminal areas where airerew and air traffic controller workload is
already high.
Ix
The ability of these flight crews to detect conflicting aircraft visually appeared to be independent of the
presence of TCAS equipment and of the level of TCAS information available. It must be recognized,
however, that the visual system used provides at best a limited simulation of the real world in its abil-
ity to reproduce the appearance of other traffic.
Conclusions
It is concluded, within the limitations Of this experiment, that TCAS II can appreciably lessen the
danger posed by conflicting air traffic, without imposing unacceptable increases in flight crew work-
load. The importance of mode C transponders, without which TCAS cannot resolve conflicts, must be
emphasized.
Careful consideration should be given to how much traffic information needs to be provided by TCAS
within the cockpit. The addition of a planform display of the position of other traffic did not improve
flight crew performance of avoidance maneuvers, though it unquestionably provided crews with much
more information concerning conflicting aircraft in the environment. This information was used by
most of the crews that had to perform avoidance maneuvers on traffic not visible to them.
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PILOTS' USE OF A TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION-AVOIDANCE
SYSTEM (TCAS lI) IN SIMULATED AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
Volume I: Methodology, Summary, and Conclusions
SUMMARY
A study of pilots' use of and responses to a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS II) in
simulated air carrier line operations is described.
A different level of information about the location of other air traffic was presented to each of three
groups of airline pilots during their execution of eight simulated air carrier flights. Traffic conflicts
were generated at intervals during the flights; where appropriate, these conflicts were visible to the
flight crews. Two of these levels represent the approaches taken by several airlines that have installed
the collision-avoidance system for an in-service evaluation. In a fourth condition, pilots flying without
TCAS II equipment were exposed to the same traffic conflicts.
To ensure safe separation of aircraft, TCAS II commands a climb, or a descent, or a reduction in the
rate of climb or descent. Aircraft separation was effective when the system was in use; no aircraft
came within 200 ft vertically and 1000 ft horizontally.
Average response times did not differ as a result of the amount of traffic information available.
Response accuracy, as measured by the root mean square overshoot in the rate of climb or descent,
also showed no differences associated with the level of traffic information. Average peak overshoots
in response varied significantly among conditions. 1) The mean for those crews with no traffic infor-
mation was 2272 ft/min greater than the commanded rate of climb or descent. 2) Those crews
presented with traffic information only during a conflict had a mean of 1221 ft/min. 3) Those with
continuous traffic information averaged 1317 ft/min. These momentary peak overshoot differences,
however, did not result in significant differences in the amount of altitude change.
No learning effects were observed. Differences in flight experience did not appear to contribute to the
small observed performance differences.
Pilots who had displays of conflicting traffic used the displays to maneuver to avoid unseen traffic
before a resolution advisory was issued by the TCAS II equipment.
While the results of this experiment represent pilot response (on initial exposure only) to this traffic
alert and collision-avoidance system under simulated conditions, they indicate (1) that pilots are able to
utilize TCAS 1I effectively within the response times allocated by the TCAS II logic, and that (2)
TCAS II, properly used, is effective in ameliorating the severity of the simulated traffic conflicts
presented in this study.
Volume I presents the methodology, research questions and results, and a summary and conclusions of
the study.
Volume II of the report contains appendices referenced in Volume I. The appendices provide details
of the experiment and the results, and contain the text of two reports written in support of the program.
INTRODUC_ON
The traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS II, referred to hereafter as TCAS) requires
prompt and accurate pilot responses to effect avoidance maneuvers, in order to prevent midair coUi-
sions. This study examined human engineering issues related to pilots' responses to the system.
A major objective of the study was to determine how the performance of a flight maneuver was
affected by the amount of precursory information provided about surrounding air traffic. That is, is a
pilot's response time or accuracy affected as the amount of information on other air traffic is varied?
The coUision-avoidance system represents additional information in the cockpit. The system is
representative of many new avionics capabilities, and therefore it afforded an excellent oppommity to
address the pervasive and expanding information transfer issues posed by advanced technology.
Several a!rlines have installed collision-avoidance systems for in-service evaluations. The carriers
involved have different philosophies regarding the amount of information needed to describe the loca-
tion of other aircraft. They have also taken different approaches toward the circumstances under which
this information is presented. Prior to these in-service evaluations, NASA Ames Research Center
teamed with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to study the human factors issues associated
with the use of the TCAS system in an operational environment.
An industry survey was performed to establish the critical human performance concerns. This was
accomplished through interviews with researchers, program engineers, and pilots familiar with the
TCAS. (For a comprehensive list of TCAS human engineering issues, see Society of Automotive
Engineers, 1987.)
The issues addressed in this study include: (1) the level of traffic location information provided to
pilots, (2) the use of TCAS in instrument and visual meteorological conditions, (3) actions taken when
the TCAS system is unable to resolve the traffic conflict, (4) pilot performance of avoidance maneuvers
that require crossing through the altitude of the intruder, (5) pilot performance of avoidance maneuvers
from level flight vs while climbing or descending, and (6) the use of TCAS with visual acquisition of
the conflicting traffic.
To provide background information for the study, the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) provided information on voluntary reports of near midair collisions received from pilots and
controllers. The ASRS definition of a near midair collision is a miss distance estimated as less than
500 ft. An incident may also be classified as a near midair collision in some cases in which miss dis-
tances are not specified but the crew states there was danger of collision. The database held 28,970
reports at the time the analysis was conducted (January 29, 1986).
In 2001 reports from pilots concerning near midair collisions, pilots reported sighting the conflicting
traffic in 1599 instances. They took evasive action in 1279 cases. Though these numbers may be
affected both by overestimation of the seriousness of the events and by underreporting to a voluntary
program, it is clear that substantial numbers of reporters felt themselves threatened by conflicting air
traffic. It is this problem that TCAS addresses by providing an independent backup both to air traffic
control (ATe) and to the ability of pilots to see and avoid other aircraft.
The investigators wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Mr. Joseph Fee and the staff of the FAA
TCAS Program Office; Mr. William Russell, Air Transport Association of America; Mr. James
Lumsden, Bendix/King Corporation; Mr. William Lynch, Sperry Dalmo-Victor Corporation; Mr. David
Lubkowski, MITRE Corporation; Mr. George Schwind and Capt. William Cotton, United Airlines; and
Capt. Robert Buley, Northwest Airlines, for their support throughout the TCAS study. We are espe-
cially indebted to the staff of the NASA Ames Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility, whose innova-
tiveness and hard work made it possible to implement the simulations under severe time constraints.
Finally, the cooperation of Air Transport Association member airlines and the excellent work of the
flight crews who participated in the experiment should be a source of pride to the air carrier industry
and its pilot representative organizations.
METHODOLOGY
Subjects
Sixteen three-person flight crews currently flying line operations in the Boeing 727 served as subjects
for this study. The Air Transport Association provided flight crews from 11 member air carriers. The
airlines were asked to send current, line-qualified pilots. The airlines varied in their method of identi-
fying participants. Several asked for interested crew members to volunteer for the study. Two crews
were randomly selected by NASA from lists of interested volunteers. Some crews were assigned by
their company, as they would be to a normal trip. The subjects were all paid for their participation.
Prior to coming to Ames Research Center, the subjects received portions of a handbook describing the
experiment (appendix A). After arrival, each subject completed the questionnaire on flight experience
found in appendix B. The mean age of the crew members was 41.4 yr (ranging from 24 to 55). Their
mean flight experience was 9682 hr (1400 to 23,500) with a mean Boeing 727 flight time of 2805 hr
(150 to 11,1300) and 2862 (50 to 17,000) in their current crew position. Their mean flight time for the
last 90 days was 157 hr (0 to 250).
In the last 90 days, 61% of the pilots reported predominantly day flying, I6% reported predominantly
night flying, and 23% reported neither day or night flying as predominant. The average number of
flight segments per day in the last 90 days was 2.9, with a range of 1 to 4. The flying in the last 90
days was reported to be predominantly long-haul by 55% of the pilots, predominantly short-haul by
34%, and 11% of the pilots reported neither short- or long-haul flying as predominant.
When asked whether they were a "morning person" or an "evening person," 66% stated they were
morning people, 29% said they were evening people, and 5% had no preference.
Experimental Design
The experimental design for the study is described in full in appendix C. Several factors were con-
sidered and counterbalanced in the design. They included ambient twilight or night light conditions
(the presence or absence of a horizon can ease or make more difficult a pilot's perception of the rela-
tive vertical motion of traffic), the pilot flying (to provide equal opportunities for visual traffic to be
sighted by either the flying or non-flying pilo0, and scenario order (flight segments varied in difficulty;
each segment was presented equally often during the first and last half of the experiment day to bal-
ance learning or possible fatigue effects).
3
Equipment
TCAS H - Pilots' use of the collision-avoidance system was evaluated using three levels of
traffic information (tables 1 and 2). All three levels provided a light and tone that alerted the crew
when an aircraft was within 40 sec of passing very close to them (a TCAS Traffic Advisory, TA). If
the aircraft continued to pose a threat when it was 20-25 see away, the system notified the crew either
to maneuver or to continue their present flight path with some restrictions (a TCAS Resolution
Advisory, RA). This advisory was visually presented on the instantaneous vertical speed indicator
(IVSI) (fig. 1). Lighted amber segments around the outer edge of the instrument indicated the vertical
rates which must be avoided. For example, a 2000 ft/min climb was indicated by lights from -6000 to
+2000 ft/min.
f TCAS
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(a) Minimal TCAS display (condition 2)
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(b) TCAS with traffic display only during conflicts (condition 3)
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(c) TCAS with continuous traffic display (condition 4)
Figure 1. Cockpit displays utilized in the TCAS experiment
J
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When a maneuver was not required but an aircraft representing a threat was within 20-25 sec of its
closest point of approach (CPA), an auditory tone sounded and the Traffic Advisory caution light was
illuminated (table 1). When it was necessary to maneuver to avoid a collision, TCAS presented a
two-tone sequence twice, followed by a voice command to "climb," "descend," or "adjust vertical
speed." The warning light was also illuminated (table 1). (For a description of the collision-
avoidance system see Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, 1983.)
TABLE 1. ALERT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TCAS IN THIS EXPERIMENT
TCAS alert Alert level Master alert 2 Voice 3 IVSI Traffic display
maneuver time-critical red light
advisory warning siren
preventive caution amber light
advisory tone
traffic caution amber light
advisory tone
proximate information
traffic
eg "climb" arc lights red
(amber) target
arc lights red
(amber) tarset
amber
target
white
target
resolution information "clear of white
complete conflict" target
TCAS time-critical red light "unable to red flag red
invalid warning siren command" target
The crews were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. These conditions represented different
levels of traffic information. Each crew was exposed to one experimental condition only.
Condition 1:
Condition 2:
Condition 3:
Condition 4:
No TCAS
TCAS with no traffic display
TCAS with traffic display during conflicts, fixed range
TCAS with continuous traffic display, pilot-selectable
horizontal and vertical ranges
Condition 1 was a control (no TCAS) case, designed to assess the responses of flight crews to the
traffic conflicts without aid from the collision-avoidance system. These crews were given the same
warnings of traffic by ATC that were provided to other crews, but they were given no additional assis-
tance with respect to traffic for which the scenarios provided no ATC warnings.
Condition 2 provided a minimal TCAS capability, with visual and auditory alerts, but without a display
of traffic. Traffic and resolution advisories were generated as in conditions 3 and 4; but the crews
flying under this condition received only the alerting function of the traffic advisory, without informa-
tion on the location of the conflicting traffic. Table 2 describes the information available within the
cockpit.
2Will continue mad traffic is clear or until canceled by pressing light/button. Tone is on for 2 see. off for 8 see, siren sounds
twice_
3Voice messages are continuous. Corrective resolutions n_quiring climb or descent through intruder's altitude will be announced in
the voice command, e.g., "climb to cross."
t.
The crews flying under condition 3 also had a display of the location of threat aircraft and up to two
other aircraft. This was presented only when a collision threat existed. It was a plan view, fixed
range, cathode ray tube display with aircraft locations shown in white, amber, and red as they became
more of a threat (fig. 1). Bearing data were subject to a :1:8 ° azimuth error, representative of the
actual antenna bearing error.
Condition 4 provided the most information about other aircraft. The location of all the aircraft being
tracked by TCAS was depicted. Bearing data were subject to a + 2° azimuth error. This traffic
display had pilot-selectable horizontal and vertical ranges of 3, 5, 10, and 20 n mi and :1: 2700, +7000
-2700, and +2700 -7000 ft. This display also contained color- and shape-coded aircraft symbols. The
information was presented continuously, even when no collision threat existed (fig. 1).
Appendix D describes in detail the training programs the crews received, and the various levels of
traffic information provided under conditions 2, 3 and 4.
TABLE 2. DISPLAY CONDITIONS FOR NASA/FAA TCAS SIMULATION
Information Master Voice IVSI Traffic
level alert commands resolution display
Condition 1 NA NA NA NA
Condition 2 X X X None
Condition 3 X X X During conflict
only, threat + 2
aircraft, ± 8° az-
imuth error
Condition 4 X X X Continuously
presented, all
traffic + 2700 ft,
+ 2 ° azimuth er-
ror
Note: In condition 3, the traffic was displayed for 15 sec each time the
crew pressed the traffic switch. The condition 4 display showed traffic
from ± 2700 ft (default) unless selected to 7000 ft above or below.
Simulation - The study was conducted in the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility at NASA
Ames Research Center. A Singer-Link Boeing 727-232 advanced technology simulator was used, with
a six-degree-of-freedom motion simulator and a Singer-Link-Miles Image II three-channel, four-
window, dusk-night visual system. Appendix E describes the simulation in greater detail.
Thesimulatorwasflown withina simulatedair trafficcontrolradarenvironment.Otheraircraftwere
heardoverthe radio and seen out of the window, weather conditions permitting. These aircraft were
under dynamic control; their initial position was preprogrammed and was triggered by the location of
the TCAS aircraft. The air Waffle included air carrier and general aviation aircraft, providing a mix of
aircraft performance.
The air traffic control simulation had three controller consoles and three keyboard aircraft work stations
capable of simulating up to 36 other aircraft. All workstations and the B-727 simulator were intercon-
nected by voice communications using appropriate air traffic control radio frequencies. The controllers
and pilots of the keyboard aircraft used voice disguisers to simulate communications among many
different controllers and pilots.
The geographic area simulated in this study included Oakland and Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Con-
trol Centers, and four terminal areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, and Stockton, Califor-
nia. Air traffic densities were appropriate for the simulated areas. The air traffic control sectors and
radio frequencies were accurately represented in the simulation. The navigation facilities and frequen-
cies for these areas were also accurately represented. Pilots used navigation charts provided by their
airlines.
Procedures
Four flight crews were randomly assigned to each of the four experimental groups; each crew received
only one level of traffic information. They reported for two consecutive days. The first day was train-
ing, and the second a typical day of line flying.
Training - After arrival, subjects filled out administrative and other questionnaires (appendices
F & B). They received initial briefings (appendix G). The first day consisted of both classroom and
simulator sessions for aircraft differences training. This varied from 2 to 4 hr, depending on the mag-
nitude of the differences between the airline 727 and NASA simulator configurations. Each captain
and first officer flew at least one instrument approach and landing. To minimize the aircraft
differences and contribute realism, each crew used its own airline's standard operating procedures.
Familiarization flights were carried out in an ATe environment with other, sometimes visible, traffic.
The differences training was followed by training on the use of the collision avoidance system. The
crews viewed a 20-rain video describing the system and demonstrating its proper use (appendix D).
This was followed by a question and answer period, and a quiz (appendix H) to ensure understanding
of the coUision-avoidance system they would use. The quiz was reviewed until each pilot was able to
answer each question correctly. This training program was representative of those being administered
by the airlines for TeAS crew training. Subjects in the baseline condition (condition 1, no TCAS)
were also shown a training tape and given a quiz. Prior to departing, crews flying conditions 2, 3 or 4
were given the al_ropriate Flight Manual Supplement for TeAS (appendix I).
Experimental Flights - On the second day, the crews reported for a normal duty day. They
received their flight plans, weather, and passenger loading information in the format used by their air-
line. The airlines also provided checklists and flight manuals so that crews were able to conduct the
flights as they would normal line operations, given the limitations of simulation. This included all
flight duties, e.g., communications with passengers, company (radio only; ARINC communications and
reporting system (ACARS) was not installed in the simulator), ground crews, and air traffic control.
Scenarios - The full-mission simulation consisted of eight flights ranging in length from 30 to
73 min. Each crew was exposed to the same scenarios including the geometry of the encounters with
other aircraft. The scenarios were counter-balanced for order of presentation, visibility, twilight/night
ambient illumination, workload, and captain/first officer flying.
Eight flight scenarios were constructed for this experiment. All the crews flew all the scenarios. All
events presented to the subjects were scenario-dependent (i.e., a particular target, an air traffic control
situation, or a malfunction was always presented in conjunction with the same specific flight leg).
The scenarios were presented to the subjects in one of the two orders shown in table 3. The initial
conditions for each new scenario were triggered by setting the parking brake when the aircraft parked
at the completion of each flight. Aside from an increase in the amount of fuel at certain stops, this
change was not visible to the crew.
TABLE 3. TCAS EXPERIMENT FLIGHT SCHEDULES
Flight
number
Sequence
712
713
716
715
Sequence
Route of flight
From To
Schedule times
Depart Arrive
Flight Block
time time
(min) (min)
SFO SCK
SCK LAX
LAX SMF
SMF SFO
SFO SMF
SMF LAX
LAX SCK
SCK SFO
0830 0902
0915 1023
1050 1200
1215 1252
1330 1406
1420 1533
1600 1702
1715 1745
0:20
0:58
0:59
0:27
0:24
1:03
0:50
0:20
0:32
1:08
1:10
0:37
0:36
1:13
1:02
0:30
715
716
713
712
LAX SCK
SCK SFO
SFO SMF
SMF LAX
LAX SMF
SMF SFO
SFO SCK
SCK LAX
0830 0932
0945 1015
1040 1116
1130 1243
1320 1430
1445 1522
1550 1622
1635 1743
0:50
0:20
0:24
1:03
0:59
0:27
0:20
0:58
1:02
0:30
0:36
1:13
1:10
0:37
0:32
1:08
The ambient light level was varied. Each scenario was presented to half the crews under twilight con-
ditions, (visible horizon), and the other half under night levels of illumination, (no appreciable hor-
izon). The weather conditions for each scenario were constant across subjects.
Captains and first officers always alternated legs; the first pilot to fly was specified by the investigators
in the pre-flight dispatch briefing. Thus half the subjects encountering each traffic conflict were cap-
tains and half were first officers. In only one case did a crew deviate somewhat from the pre-set
schedule.
The scenarios varied considerably in workload induced by air traffic control, other traffic in the sur-
round, and in one segment by a deliberate aircraft malfunction. There were short flights at lower alti-
tudes and longer flights at high altitudes. There were two terminal areas with high traffic density and
two with low density. Aside from these imposed differences, crews were free to adjust their cockpit
workload as they normally would.
In all cases, the actual weather was similar to that forecasted. The weather varied from very good visi-
bility with substantial low-level winds and turbulence at San Francisco, to fog at Stockton. The actual
and forecast weather are shown in appendix J.
Fuel loads were as shown in the flight planning documents; several crews asked for, and were given,
more fuel than the minimum provided.
The aircraft was planned to have no malfunctions, except for a single generator failure during a turn to
final approach to Los Angeles. In a few cases, however, unplanned simulator malfunctions occurred
and were coped with by the crew as they arose. The most serious consequence was a missed
approach, subsequently resulting in a successful landing.
Each scenario had a written script used by the air traffic controllers and keyboard aircraft pilots (see
appendix K for an example). Conflict geometry is described in appendix L. The crews were able to
hear the clearances given to the other aircraft and discern their positions and courses, as in actual
flight. For some of the traffic, the controllers gave a traflie advisory, while other traffic was unan-
nounced.
Data collection - All data were immediately deidentified as to subject identity and airline
affiliation. In addition to the computerized data, video tapes of the cockpit and the traffic display pro-
vided information regarding the crew responses. Audio recordings of the cockpit communications, and
the radio communications with air traffic control, provided further information. Two experimenters
continually observed the crew via cockpit cameras and microphones. Their observations were recorded
on the forms found in appendix M. Pilots rated the workload of each flight on the rating forms found
in appendix N. The subjective evaluation made by the pilots was in response to the questionnaire
found in appendix O, however further evaluation was informally conducted in a debriefing discussion
period (appendix P).
Performance measures - To ensure safe separation from an approaching aircraft, the collision-
avoidance system commands a climb, a descent, or a reduction in rate of climb or descent. In this
study, the accomplishment of these maneuvers, and the effects of the maneuvers on spacing between
aircraft were evaluated.
To assess pilot performance of the avoidance maneuvers prescribed by the TCAS, the following depen-
dent measures were evaluated: (1) the type of maneuver advisory; (2) separation between aircraft at
CPA; (3) rams or changes in vertical speed based on information from the traffic display; (4) the time
of initial stick or throttle movement in response to the maneuver advisory; (5) the direction of initial
response; (6) the time to attain the commanded vertical speed; (7) the root mean square of the
difference between the actual and the commanded vertical speed; (8) the peak instantaneous vertical
speed overshoot; (9) the time to initiate and complete a return to the previous altitude (where level) or
to the previous vertical speed (where climbing or descending) after the maneuver;, (10) the altitude
change resulting from the maneuver, and (11) whether the intruder aircraft was visually acquired.
Other measures were also examined, including subjective ratings of the simulation and the TCAS, and
pilot flight experience.
Instrumentation - The simulated (IVSI) used in this simulation were prototype instruments with
several limitations. The eyebrow lights installed in the instruments were unable to command a 1500
ft/min rate of climb or descent; 2000 ft/min had to be used instead of the 1500 ft/min specified for
flight maneuvers in actual implementation of the TCAS system. For this reason, certain values
observed in this study, (e.g., the peak vertical speed overshoot and the altitude change resulting from a
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maneuver), are somewhat inflated due to the use of the 2000 ft/min rate of climb or descent and the
resolution of the pilot's instrument at that value. The time to attain the commanded vertical speed was
calculated for 1500 ft/min for climb and descent advisories to yield a closer approximation of values
that might be obtained in flight.
It should also be noted that the IVSI needles, (made of lucite plastic), on these simulated instruments
were harder to read than the needles on actual flight instruments. This may also have degraded accu-
racy in attaining commanded speeds.
Occurrences - The traffic conflicts presented to the flight crews were modeled on the basis of
actual near midair collisions reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. They were appropriate
for altitude, location, and phase of flighL The traffic conflicts were programmed to produce three to
four traffic advisories per hr. With approximately 6 hr of flight this would result in 18-24 traffic
advisories per crew. One in four of these traffic conflicts was programmed to be likely to produce a
maneuver advisory (six per crew).
TABLE 4. NUMBER OF TRAFFIC AND RESOLUTION ADVISORIES
BY LEVEL OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION
Experimemal Traffic Resolution Ratio of
condition advisories advisories TA : RA
1. No TCAS equipment 80 33 2.4 : 1
Number per flight hi" 3.33 1.38 ---
2. No traffic display 84 24 3.5 : 1
3. Conflict traffic 65 21 3.1 : 1
4. Continuous display 85 33 2.6 : 1
Total for TCAS crews 234 78 3.0 : 1
Number per flight hr 3.25 1.08 ---
Table 4 shows the numbers of traffic advisories and the number and types of resolution advisories
received by the crews exposed to each display condition. The number of resolution advisories that
would have been received by the control crews had they had TCAS is also shown, for comparison.
Chi-square analysis indicated that there was not a significant difference between control and TCAS
crews with regard to the frequency of traffic conflicts.
A total of 78 resolution advisories were of the following types:
Climb .................... 18 (23%)
Do not climb ........... 8 (10%)
Descend ................. 18 (23%)
Do not descend ...... 34 (44%)
Total ....................... 78 (100%)
Maneuver advisories with visual contact totaled 55% ; preventive advisories (requiring no maneuver)
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totaled 24% ; and altitude-crossing maneuver advisories totaled 19%.
Note that the frequency of advisories simulated in this study is far greater than that measured in air-
craft operating with TCAS (table 5). The rate of traffic and maneuver advisories was established arbi-
trarily to provide as much pilot performance data as possible within the confines of the single day
available for each experimental flight crew, without unduly burdening them or making their situation
grossly unrealistic. An effort was made to present the conflicts at irregular intervals and during por-
tions of the flights representing both high and low workload periods.
TABLE $. TCAS ALERTS OBSERVED DURING LINE FLYING
Flight Traffic Resolution Ratio of
condition advisories advisories TA : RA
828 hrs of line flying
Number per flight hr
473 38 12.4 : 1
0.57 0.05 ---
Maneuver advisories with visual contact 73%
Preventive advisories 16%
Womack 1987)
RESULTS: ORGANIZED BY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions addressed in the data analysis and the results of the analyses are described in
the following sections. A summary of this Information can be found in the Executive Summary.
1. Did TCAS improve safety?
The primary measure of TCAS effectiveness is that some reasonable standard of separation is main-
tained between conflicting aircraft. In this study, horizontal separations of less than 500 and 1000 ft,
and vertical separations of less than 100 and 200 t, were arbitrarily chosen as criteria for separation.
When TCAS was in use, there were no occurrences in which minimum separation from transponder-
equipped intruder aircraft was ever less than 1000 ft horizontally and 200 ft vertically at the same time.
Crews not using TCAS were exposed to the same traffic conflicts (though random variation in flight
paths produced variation in precise encounter geometries). There was one instance of separation of
less than 500 ft horizontally and 100 ft vertically. The crew was in visual contact with this aircraft,
which was not announced by ATC, for 13 see before it passed 316 ft horizontally and 32 ft vertically
from their aircraft. In addition, there were three instances of separation less than 1000 ft horizontally
and 200 ft vertically; all of these aircraft were visually acquired at some time during the encounter.
Minimum separation at the point of closest approach was 529 it horizontally and 58 ft vertically in this
group. The crews using TCAS were significantly less likely to incur inadequate separation by this cri-
terion (less than 1000 ft horizontally and 200 ft vertically) (exact binomial test, p<.05).
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ForTCAScases,theseparationgainedasa resultof avoidance maneuvers was determined by extrapo-
lating from the aircraft's flight path prior to the maneuver to the closest point of approach. In 37 of 40
cases examined in this way, adherence to the TCAS maneuver command produced increased separation
between conflicting aircraft. In four cases, separation without the maneuver would have been less than
1000/200 ft; in one of these, minimum separation would have been 402 and 18 ft. The methodology
and results from this analysis are described in Appendix Q and (Tuttell, 1988). In 3 of 40 cases,
separation associated with adherence to the TCAS-commanded maneuver was slightly decreased by the
commanded maneuver. Analysis (Lubkowski, D., MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia: Personal
Communication, March, 1988.) indicated that TCAS inaccurately predicted the time to CPA because of
a large lateral miss distance. The TCAS II logic does not consider bearing information; the system
was therefore unaware that the lateral miss distance would be so large. In none of these three
encounters was closest separation less than 9000 ft horizontally.
2. Are pilots able to initiate avoidance maneuvers within the 5 sec allocated by the TCAS logic?
TCAS is designed to evaluate conflict aireraft trajectories long enough to minimize the number of false
alarms while allowing ample time for pilot and aircraft response to provide adequate separation. The
mean response time found in this simulation was 1.9 sec from the onset of a corrective resolution
advisory to the first fore/aft stick or throttle movement (fig. 2). The standard deviation was 1.34 see.
There was only one instance in the 57 advisories requiring a maneuver in which a pilot responded
more slowly than 5 see, i.e., in 7 see. This did not result in unsafe separation.
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Figure 2. Distribution of initial response times to TCAS corrective resolution advisories. These
times were evaluated from digital printouts of altitude, altitude rate, throttle cross-shaft angle
and control column position evaluated once each sec.
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The reaction times found in a study such as this may well be better than in operational service, since
the pilots knew that TCAS was under investigation. Nonetheless, this study does demonstrate that the
range of reaction times is within the limits of the system.
3. Do pilots respond correctly to the maneuver advisories presented on the vertical speed indicator
and annunciated in the verbal warnings?
All responses in this study were in the correct direction (e.g., all pilots descended when the system
commanded a descent). This differs from results obtained by Boucek, et al., 1985. The pilots
responded with greater rates of climb and descent than were required by the system (see question 4).
This caused separation to increase more rapidly, but altitude changes were greater than were required.
The degree of response accuracy was measured by the root mean square of the difference between the
vertical velocity and the commanded vertical velocity. RMS overshoots ranged from 48 to 5517
ft/min, with a mean of 1327, and standard deviation of 1152.
4. Using TCAS, are pilots able to attain safe separation with minimal impact on air traffw, control?
The not unreasonable concern has been expressed that pilots responding to TCAS commands may
maneuver into the altitude of another aircraft. This is most likely in low altitude high density terminal
airspace where vertical separation is 1000 ft. The mean altitude change from level flight required by
TCAS during corrective maneuver advisories in this experiment was 652 t, with a range from 16 to
1971 ft. The mean altitude change from level flight as a result of pilot responses to corrective
maneuver advisories was 852 It, with a range from 16 to 2123 It, and a standard deviation of 583 ft
(n=20) (fig. 3).
Nine pilots responded actively to a preventive resolution advisory, in which a maneuver was not
required. The mean altitude change from level flight as a result of pilot responses to preventive
maneuver advisories was 206 ft, with a range from 3 to 854 ft, and a standard deviation of 309 ft
(n=9) (fig. 4). The mean altitude change from level flight for both corrective and preventive advisories
was 652 ft, (range 3 to 2123, standard deviation 592, n = 29).
5. Did pilots with more traffic information respond differently to maneuver advisories?
Four captains and four first officers were exposed to each level of traffic information. The number of
maneuvers made with each of these traffic displays ranged from 21 to 33, averaging 26 per display
condition. Analyses of variance were performed on the pilot performance measures by display condi-
tion. These included (1) response time from the onset of the maneuver advisory to the initiation of
stick or throttle movement to change the vertical speed, (2) time to attain commanded vertical speed,
(3) accuracy of vertical speed (root mean square (rms) of vertical velocity error and peak vertical velo-
city overshoot), (4) time to initiate a return to altitude after the traffic conflict, and (5) magnitude of
altitude change as a result of the maneuver.
No differences in response time were found as a function of the amount of traffic information
presented. Only peak vertical velocity overshoot showed significant differences across levels of traffic
information (F=5.28, df=2,64, p<.01). Crews with no traffic display had the greatest peak overshoot
(mean of 2272 ft/min greater than commanded velocity). Crews with a continuous traffic display of all
traffic had the next highest peak overshoot (1317). The crews with traffic displayed only during a
conflict had the least overshoot with a mean of 1221 ft/min. This measure is only a momentary value
and does not represent performance throughout the avoidance maneuver; the rms vertical velocity
overshoot is a continuous measure of the accuracy of the avoidance maneuver, and this did not differ
significantly across conditions. Changes in altitude during avoidance maneuvers did not vary with
display condition.
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Pilots using TCAS (conditions 2, 3, and 4) were asked to rate the usefulness of the traffic advisory in
preparing for evasive maneuvers on a scale from 1 to 10. For those with no traffic display, this meant
only a light and a tone. There were no differences in ratings associated with the level of traffic infor-
mation provided. The mean was 7.7, with a standard deviation of 1.4.
The level of traffic information was associated with differences in some ratings, however. Distraction
perceived as caused by the addition of TCAS to other flight duties was generally rated as low
(mean=2.6). The distraction rating was least for those with traffic display during a conflict only
(mean=l.8, median=l.5); those with no traffic display had a mean of 2.1 (median=l.5). Those with
continuous traffic information rated the distraction as 3.8 (median=3.5). These differences were
significant (F=3.62, df=2,33, p<.05, for the arcsin transformed data).
The same pattern was found when crew members were asked to rate the distraction of the auditory
alert and caution/warning lights in their function of attracting the crew's attention. All TCAS crews
had the same auditory alert and caution/warning lights, yet there were differences in their perceptions
of the distraction caused by these alerts (F=6.15, df=2,33, p<.01, for the arcsin transformed data).
Crews with no traffic display rated the distraction 2.2 (median=l.5). Those with traffic information
during a conflict only gave a mean rating of 1.5 (median-l.0). Pilots with continuous traffic informa-
tion rated distraction as 4.4 (median of 4.5) on a 10-point scale.
Crews with no traffic display (condition 2) rated the perceived effectiveness of the auditory alert and
caution/warning light in getting the pilot's attention as 8.5 on a ten-point scale (median=9.0). Pilots
with traffic during conflicts only (condition 3) gave mean and median ratings of 8.0. Pilots with con-
tinuous traffic information rated the distraction of the auditory alert and lights highest, but rated the
effectiveness lowest (mean--7.2, median=8.0) (F=3.44, df=2,33, p<.05 for the arcsin transformed data).
6. Are pilots able to use TCAS correctly without a traffic display?
In condition 2, pilots flew without a planform display of traffic. Their responses to maneuver
advisories did not differ in magnitude, or kind, from those of the crews that saw displays of the
conflicting traffic. Performance by crews having no traffic display was equivalent to that of crews who
had displays of traffic either during conflicts or continuously. The only measure that differed
significantly when these two groups were compared was peak vertical velocity. As noted above, pilots
without a display of traffic information had higher peak vertical velocity overshoots (mean of 2272
ft/min greater than commanded) during the performance of the TCAS maneuvers than those who were
able to see the location of conflicting traffic on their displays prior to the maneuver (1277 ft/min),
(1::=10.62, dr=l,65, p<.01). RMS velocity overshoot however, did not differ among groups.
The pilots who had a traffic display were asked "Did the traffic advisory display provide confidence in
the correctness of the subsequent maneuver advisory?" All 24 agreed that it did.
7. Did pilots respond differently to different maneuver advisories?
The maneuvers were grouped into: climb, descend, reduce rate of climb, and reduce rate of descent.
Reaction time to the advisory, response accuracy, and time to initiate a return to altitude did not vary
with the type of maneuver.
The period from the time of the resolution advisory to the attainment of commanded vertical velocity
was least when reducing rate of descent (4.5 sec from onset of advisory), only slightly greater for
climbs (4.7), descents were next at 6.2, and it took pilots longest to attain the commanded vertical
speed when reducing rate of climb (7.8 see) (F---4.03, df=3,53, t><.05). The altitude change as a result
of the maneuver was least for the advisory to reduce climb (153 ft), next were reductions in descent
rate (311 ft), climbs averaged 725, and descents 790 ft 0:--6.84, df=3_4, p<.001). There were no
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significantinteractions between level of traffic information and maneuver type.
8. Did pilots alter their flight path in response to a preventive advisory?
At least 30% of TCAS resolution advisories do not require a change in flight path. Such alerts indi-
cate that the present flight path is safe, but the pilot is advised of a range of vertical speeds that would
take his aircraft too close to the intruder. In this experiment these advisories were issued as cautions
and were not accompanied by a voice warning. There were 19 preventive advisories, 24 percent of the
total. On 9 occasions, crews did not follow the instructions in the training program and climbed or
descended from level flight when they received a preventive advisory. The maximum vertical velocity
was +2081 ft/min in regrmse to a preventive "do not descend" advisory which occurred while the air-
craft was in level flight on autopilot. For those cases in which a change of altitude was initiated from
level flight, the mean altitude change was 206 ft, with a range from 3 to 854 It, and a standard devia-
tion of 309 ft (fig. 4).
9. Were pilots more likely to visually acquire an intruder with more traffic information?
The probability of visual detection of traffic that had evoked a TCAS traffic advisory (or that would
have done so, in the case of condition 1) was virtually the same for all conditions, about 55% (.table
6). Similarly, the traffic recorded by observers as not detected, based on a statement from within the
cockpit, did not differ significantly across conditions (chi-square ---7.8, d.f. = 9, ms.).
TABLE 6. VISUAL DETECTION OF TRAFFIC vs LEVEL OF INFORMATION
Experiment Total traffic Detected Not detected Unknown
condition advisories visually visually
1. No TCAS 84 44 (52%) 25 (30%) 15 (18%)
2. No traffic display 67 39 (58%) 25 (37%) 3 (5%)
3. Conflict display 64 36 (56%) 17 (27%) 11 (17%)
4. Continuous display 76 41 (54%) 26 (34%) 9 (12%)
One non-transponder target was presented; it crossed the 727's flight path near final approach altitude
just outside the outer marker under conditions of limited visibility. This was a difficult target to see
and was designed to evaluate outside visual scan at a busy time in the flight. The target was detected
by three of four non-TCAS crews (75%) and by 5 of 12 TCAS crews (42%); but because of the small
number of observations, the difference, though suggestive, is not statistically significant. It cannot be
said with certainty, therefore, either that visual detection of intruders was enhanced by the presence of
TCAS, with or without a planform display, or that outside visual scan was less comprehensive and
effective because of the presence of TCAS within the cockpit.
A degree of caution must be exercised in extrapolating these results to the real world. The simulator
visual system's portrayal of other air traffic is accurate with respect to location, but other aircraft light-
ing is less bright than in the real world. All other things being equal, one would expect a higher pro-
bability of detection in actual flight than in the simulator.
As might be expected, the levels of traffic information provided were reflected in the crews' percep-
tions of the assistance provided by TCAS in visual detections of traffic. The crews were asked to rate
how useful TCAS was in this regard. On a 10-point scale from "not at all useful" to "very useful,"
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crews with no traffic display gave a mean rating of 4.3 (median 4.5); those with traffic presented only
during conflicts rated the usefulness at 8.3 (median 9.0); and crews with continuous traffic information
rated TCAS usefulness at 9.25 (median 9.5) (F=21.26, df=2,33, p<.001 for arcsin-transformed rating
data). The difference between the perceived and observed usefulness of the traffic display for visual
detection was substantial in this study.
I0. Did pilots hesitate or respond differently when a maneuver advisory occurred after visually acquir-
ing an intruder?
A one-way analysis of variance showed no performance effects associated with pilots having visual
contact with the conflicting aircraft. (See the discussion in question 15 regarding visual sighting in the
altitude crossing case.)
11. Did the level of traffic information affect pilots' responses differently when a maneuver advisory
occurred after visually acquiring an intruder?
The omy performance measure which showed an interaction between display condition and visual
acquisition was time to attain commanded vertical velocity (F--4.32, df=2,51, I><.05) (table 7). The
time to establish the vertical velocity prescribed by TCAS was greater when the crews had the traffic
in sight, except for those crews who had a continuous display of all the traffic.
TABLE 7. MEAN TIME TO ATTAIN COMMANDED VERTICAL VELOCITY
Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4
Visual no traffic conflict traffic continuous traffic
acquisition (s¢0) (see) (see)
Acquired 4.87 7.25 5.09
Not acquired 4.75 3.67 6.08
12. Did pilots respond differently to a maneuver advisory which occurred in instrument meteorological
conditions ( IM C)?
Since pilots flying under IMC were not able to visually clear the airspace into which they were
maneuvering, it was speculated that they might hesitate in their responses. There were no statistically
significant differences between the performance of maneuvers in instrument and in visual conditions.
13. Was any hesitation due to instrument meteorological conditions affected by the amount of traffic
information?
There were no such interactions for any of the performance measures.
Pilots were asked "Were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver in instrument meteorological con-
ditions?". They gave ratings from "not at all reluctant" to "very reluctant" on a 10-point scale. Their
responses differed as a function of the amount of traffic information available (F--4.72, df=2,31, p<.05
for arcsin transformed rating data). Those with traffic displayed only during a conflict were least reluc-
tam (mean=2.5, median=2.0); those with no traffic display were virtually equal in their reluctance
(mean=2.6, median=2.0). The pilots with continuous traffic position information perceived themselves
as most reluctant to maneuver in instnmaent meteorological conditions (mean=5.2, median=6.0). Their
performance, however, did not mirror these subjective ratings.
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14. Did pilots hesitate or respond incorrectly when a maneuver advisory required crossing through
another aircraft's altitude?
If a conflicting aircraft is climbing or descending at a rapid rate, TCAS may issue a maneuver advisory
that requires the pilot to cross through the other aircraft's present altitude. For example, if the intruder
is above the TCAS aircraft but descending, the best maneuver may be a climb, since the other aircraft
will be below ownship at the point of closest approach. There were significant differences in pilot per-
formance between those maneuvers which required pilots to cross through the intruder aircraft's alti-
tude and those that did not.
A one-way analysis of variance of reaction times showed significantly longer times from the onset of
the advisory to the first stick or throttle movement when the advisory required passing through an
intruder's altitude (F=10.63, df=l,63, p<.01). The mean response time when crossing altitudes was 2.9
see, vs 1.7 see when not crossing altitudes. Pilots may have compensated for the longer response time
with a higher vertical speed. The rms vertical velocity was greater than required by 2163 ft/min when
the pilots were climbing or descending through the intruder's altitude vs 1081 ft/min when not crossing
(1:=10.33, dr=l,55, p<.01). The peak overshoot in vertical velocity was also greater when crossing
altitudes, 2447 vs 1346 ft/min (F=9.92, df=l,65, 1><.01). The mean time to return tot he altitude at
which the maneuver began was also longer when crossing altitudes, 42.4 vs 19.5 see when not cross-
ing, (F=13.34, df=l,46, p<.001). As would be expected from these results, the amount of altitude
change was greater as a result of a maneuver crossing through the other aircraft's altitude, 1100 vs 379
ft (F=37.69, dr=l,56, p<.001).
15. Did visual acquisition affect pilot performance during an altitude crossing maneuver?
There were no differences in performance as a function of visual acquisition when the maneuver
required that pilots cross through an intruder's altitude. That is, no performance measure showed
significant interactions between visual acquisition and altitude crossing encoumers.
There was one instance in which a crew correctly anticipated an altitude crossing maneuver by visually
monitoring the intruder's flight path. They maneuvered prior to the maneuver advisory and descended
through the other aircraft's altitude. In another instance, however, a captain instructed the first officer
not to follow a climb maneuver advisory because he saw the traffic above. He then realized that the
other aircraft was descending, and they indeed needed to climb to avoid it. At that moment he took
control of the aircraft and executed the climb maneuver.
16. Did pilot responses differ as a function of more traffic information when the evasive maneuver
required crossing through the intruder's altitude?
Both the level of traffic information and altitude crossing maneuvers were significant in a two-way
analysis of variance of the time to initiate a response (F=6.02, df=2,59, p<.01 and F=12.85, df=l,59,
p<.001). Pilots with no traffic display were quickest to initiate the maneuver with a mean reaction
time of 1.6 see; those with traffic always present had a mean of 1.8, and those with traffic only during
a conflict averaged 2.6 sec. As discussed above, the time to initiate a maneuver was greater when the
maneuver would take the aircraft through the altitude of the traffic. The interaction between level of
traffic information and altitude crossing/noncrossing maneuvers was significant for reaction time
(/:=3.47, df=2,59, p<.05). The difference between crossing and noncrossing reaction times became
greater as the mean reaction time increased across traffic display conditions (table 8).
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TABLE 8. RESPONSETIMES vs LEVEL OF INFORMATION AND
CROSSING REQUIREMENT
Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4
Required no traffic conflict traffic continuous traffic
maneuver (sec) (_¢_) (sec)
Altitude crossing 1.60 4.25 3.00
No crossing 1.59 2.00 1.50
The interaction between level of traffic information and altitude crossing/noncrossing was also
significant for rms vertical velocity error (1=5.07, df=2,51, p<.01). Those with only conflict traffic
displayed had the greatest rms vertical velocity when crossing and the least when not crossing the
intruder's altitude (table 9).
TABLE 9. RMS VERTICAL VELOCITY ERROR vs CROSSING MANEUVERS
Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4
Required no traffic conflict traffic continuous traffic
maneuver fro (I_) . fit)
Altitude crossing 1812 3243 1520
No crossing 1554 697 1016
Pilots were asked "were you reluctant to perform a TCAS maneuver that required you to cross through
another aircraft's altitude?". They rated their answers from "not at all reluctant" to "very reluctant" on
a ten-point scale. Their responses differed based on the amount of traffic information they had avail-
able (1---4.24, df=2,26, 13<.05 for arcsin transformed rating data). Those with the traffic display only
during a conflict were least reluctant (mean-3.1, median=2.0), and those with no traffic display were
next in their reluctance (mean--4.6, median-5.0). The pilots with continuous traffic position informa-
tion were the most reluctant to cross through an intruder's altitude (mean=5.5, median=6.0).
17. Was the response to a maneuver advisory affected by the aircraft's flight attitude? Did this vary
with the amount of traffu: information?
The average time from the onset of the maneuver advisory to the first fore/aft stick or throttle move-
ment was greater when maneuvering from level (2.5 see) than from a climb or descent (1.5 sec)
(1=9.97, df=l,63, p<.01). The rms vertical velocity overshoot was also greater when maneuvering
from level (1695 (t/rain) than from a climb or descent (i079) (1--4.14, df=l,55, 1><.05). The altitude
change as a result of the maneuver was greater when maneuvering from level (652 ft) than from a
climb or descent (404 ft) (F--4.34, dr=l,56, p<.05). The time to return to within 300 ft of the altitude
at which the maneuver began was compared to the time to reestablish the rate of climb/descent from
which the maneuver began. These were significantly different (1=34.86, dr=l,46, and p<.001). When
maneuvering from level flight, the mean time to return to an altitude was 40.8 see, with a standard
deviation of 23.1 see. The time to reestablish the rate of climb/descent averaged 13.1 see and had a
standard deviation of 7.0 see. There were no interactions between aircraft flight attitude and the level
of traffic information for any of the performance measures.
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18. Did pilot reaction time to the maneuver advisory or response accuracy improve with experience or
deteriorate with fatigue? Was pilot performance affected differently by experience, given different
levels of traffic information?
There was no change over time in any of the performance measures, on average. Had a learning effect
been present, one might have anticipated improvement in these measures. Fatigue, on the other hand,
might have been expected to produce progressive decrements in performance (duty times often
exceeded 10 hours). It is not possible to separate one effect from the other;, all that can be said is that
no trends in either direction were found in the performance data.
There were no interactions for any performance measure between the level of traffic information and
the sequential number of the maneuver.
19. Were there any effects on workload when TCAS was added to the cockpit? Did increasing the
amount of traffic information affect crew workload?
Participants in the experiment were briefed during their instruction period regarding the use of the
NASA Task Load Index (TLX) instrument (appendix N). During the experiment, each flight crew
member filled out a brief workload questionnaire at the conclusion of each flight segment. The work-
load scales evaluate perceived _e mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance,
effort, and frustration. The workload instrument has been validated in previous simulation and flight
research (Hart & Staveland; Shively et al., 1987).
Overall workload was significantly higher in captains and first officers when they were flying the air-
craft. There were significant differences among flight segments, shorter segments and segments into
high-density terminal areas being associated with higher workload. Second officer workload ratings
showed a strong association with flight segments.
Second officers tended to perceive higher workload without TCAS than with it, but the trend was not
significant. First officers had nearly significant differences in perceived workload (p=.058) across
TCAS conditions; condition 3 (traffic display only during conflicts) invoked the lowest level of work-
load and condition 4 (full-time traffic display) the highest. Captains perceived no significant difference
in workload across information levels (Battiste, V; and Bortolussi, M. R.: NASA Ames Research
Center report in preparation, 1988).
20. What did pilots do when a TCAS invalid occurred?
The training program advised the crews to resolve the conflict themselves using all available informa-
tion. Also they were advised to stop following the previous TCAS advisory and return to previous
clearance, if notified of a TCAS invalid (i.e., when the present maneuver was not projected to provide
at least 100 fl vertical separation in the correct direction at CPA). Despite the inclusion in the experi-
mentof a double conflict, design__in a n attempt to invoke an invalid for each flight crew, only one
TCAS invalid in a TCAS-equipped flight occurred.
In the single TCAS Invalid occurrence, a descent maneuver advisory was issued; this was followed 5
sec later by an invalid advisory, "unable to command." The crew began to arrest their descent rate.
They received a climb advisory to avoid the other aircraft 4 see after the invalid. The crew responded
to the climb advisory, and they received a second invalid 7 sec after the climb advisory. They ignored
this advisory and continued to climb. The traffic was visually acquired.
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21. Did pilots maneuver prior to a maneuver advisory based on the information on the traffic display?
If so, were they more likely to do so with more traffic information?
The TCAS traffic advisory display is designed to assist pilots to establish visual contact with
conflicting traffic. It may also be used to observe the flight paths of nearby traffic and to monitor the
relative altitude differences between the TCAS aircraft and other aircraft in the vicinity. This allows
the pilots to see dangerous situations developing and to prepare for possible evasive maneuvering
directed by TCAS.
Eight of the 16 flight crews flew with this traffic display, shown either during conflicts or continuously.
They were thoroughly briefed that the traffic advisory display was for traffic information only and was
not to be used for evasive maneuvering. The IVSI display was to be used for evasive maneuvers in
the vertical plane following a maneuver advisory. In general, the pilots adhered to the guidelines that
they were given.
There were 14 detected occurrences, however, in which the pilots used their own experience and judg-
ment to maneuver the aircraft based on the traffic advisory display information. Each of these incidents
is described in detail in appendix R and Tuttell, 1988. A summary follows.
Course and altitude adjustments by crews with a traffic display showing the location of traffic only
during a conflict (condition 3):
Crew 1:
Crew 2:
Crew 3:
Crew 4:
No maneuvers
2 altitude adjustments and 2 turns
1 altitude adjustment
1 altitude adjustment and 1 turn
Course and altitude adjustments by crews with a traffic display showing the location of traffic continu-
ously (condition 4):
Crew 1:
Crew 2:
Crew 3:
Crew 4:
1 altitude adjustment
3 altitude adjustments
No altitude adjustments; 1 turn
I altitude adjustment and 1 turn
An analysis of the fourteen incidents shows a few patterns. Altitude adjustments accounted for 64% of
the total adjustments (9 out of 14). The majority of the adjustments occurred during descents (10 out
of 14). Three of the turn adjustments involved maneuvers to avoid a mode A (no altitude reporting)
transponder equipped aircraft. The most common scenario involved the TCAS aircraft descending on
top of another aircraft. These situations gave the pilots enough warning so that they could observe the
dangerous situation developing on the traffic advisory display and take corrective action. The correc-
tive action usually resulted in a decrease in the rate of descent or a level-off above the assigned alti-
tude for a short period of time. There were no altitude changes from level flight. All of the fourteen
adjustments caused small deviations from air traffic control clearances for short time periods. Each
crew attempted to notify air traffic control of the aititude deviations as soon as workload permitted.
As shown above, there were seven cases of maneuvers prior to a maneuver advisory based on traffic
location information by pilots who had the traffic presented only during a conflict, and an equal
number of anticipatory maneuvers by crews who had traffic information continuously presented.
Crew members were asked "Do you feel the information on the traffic display is accurate enough to be
used to maneuver your aircraft?" Twelve flew with displays with a 2° rms error in the relative bearing
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of the traffic. Eleven of them answered yes to the above question. Eleven of the twelve pilots who
flew with displays having an 8° rms error also felt the information was accurate enough to be used for
maneuvering.
22. How did evasive action differ with and without TCAS?
As noted above, 9 of 14 anticipatory maneuvers by TCAS-equipped crews were altitude or altitude rate
adjustments, five were turns. Non-TCAS crews (condition 1) maneuvered on 17 visually sighted
intruders that would have caused maneuver advisories, had they been TCAS-equipped. Of these
maneuvers, 9 were altitude or altitude rate adjustments, 8 were turns.
The pilots in condition 1 generally made less abrupt maneuvers than did pilots using TCAS, probably
because they maneuvered only enough to maintain visual separation rather than observing the set
response pattern required by TCAS procedures. A few maneuvers were severe, however;, one involved
a peak descent rate of 7832 fthnin, in a descent case which may have involved a visual misperception
resulting from aircraft pitch angle at the time of the encounter.
The hypothesized visual misperception was noted several times during test flying of thesescenarios. It
occurs by virtue of the substantial range of pitch angles attained by turbojet aircraft during normal
operations, approximately +20 to -10 ° . In a climb or descent at night, without a visible horizon and
especially without ground lights, it can be very difficult to perceive whether a conflicting aircraft is
above or below ownship, and whether it is climbing, stationary, or descending with respect to ownship.
TCAS, and especially its traffic display, can be extremely helpful by resolving the perceptual ambiguity
inherent in such situations.
23. What individual differences were there in pilots' response to maneuver advisories?
One of the more interesting findings of this study was the variability in responses to TCAS avoidance
maneuvers. The range of reaction times was from 1 to 7 sec; the standard deviation was 1.3 sec
(n=57). The range of times to attain the commanded vertical speed was from 1 to 10 see; the stan-
dard deviation was 2.2 see (n=54). The range of rms vertical velocity overshoots was from 182 to
5517 ft/min; the standard deviation was 1172 ft/min (n=52). The range of times to initiate a return to
altitude when clear of the traffic was from 1 to 6 see; the standard deviation was 1.8 see (n=44). The
time to return to the altitude at which the aircraft was level at the start of the maneuver, or, if not
level, the time to reestablish the previous rate of climb or descent, ranged from 2 to 93 see, with a
standard deviation of 20.9 see.
Pilots were asked to evaluate their understanding of the operation and limitations of TCAS from very
limited to very complete, 1 to 10. The range of responses was 3 to 9, with a standard deviation of 1.4
(n=36). Pilots were also asked to rate the operational procedures for TCAS from very inappropriate to
very appropriate. The range of responses was from 5 to 9, with a standard deviation of 1.1 (n=36).
They were asked the question "Would you be satisfied with this TCAS system as a safety enhancement
to the airplane you fly?" They rated the system from "greatly dissatisfied _' to "greatly satisfied." The
responses ranged from 3 to 9, with a standard deviation of 1.4 (n=36). There were no significant
differences associated with information level.
24. Were there performance differences between captains and first officers?
There were no differences between the responses to maneuver advisories by captains and first officers.
There were also no interactions between level of traffic information and crew position for any of the
performance measures. None of the questions on the questionnaire were answered differently by cap-
tains and first officers. The total flight time for captains averaged 13,250 hr with a range of 3500 to
21,000. The pilot with 3500 hr was currently flying as first officer for his airline but had begun
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trainingfor captain. Themeantotal flight time for first officers Was 7100 with a range of 3500 to
12,000 hr.
25. Did pilots assigned to the display conditions differ in flight experience?
The crews were randomly assigned to the display conditions. An analysis of differences between con-
ditions vs piloting experience showed no differences in age, total flying time, or time in crew position.
There were significant differences in Boeing 727 flight time among the pilots assigned to the display
conditions. Pilots with no traffic display had a mean of 2008 hr, those with traffic displayed only dur-
ing a conflict averaged 4379, and the pilots with traffic continuously presented had 1182 hr of Boeing
727 time (F=5.70, df=2,32, p<.01). Flight time in the last 90 days also differed among pilots across
the three display conditions: those with no display averaged 136 hr, those with only conflict traffic
displayed, 204, and those with all the traffic displayed, 129 hr (I:=5.29, df=2,32, p<.05).
26. Did the pilots assigned to each display condition evaluate the simulation equally?
There were no differences among the pilots assigned to the four display conditions in their evaluation
of the simulation. Questions 1-4 in appendix O addressed the procedures, the air traffic control ser-
vices, the handling qualities of the simulator, and the differences due to airline configuration. The
pilots in all the display conditions rated these qualities similarly. See appendix S for the responses to
each question.
27. What were the pilots' subjective evaluations of the TCAS?
Pilots rated the adequacy of the TCAS training they received as 8.3 on a scale of 1 to 10 (from "not at
all adequate" to "very adequate"). Their mean rating of the distraction due to the addition of TCAS to
their other flight duties was 2.6. (See question 5.) TCAS was rated as useful for reducing the risk of
midair collisions (mean=8.0). TCAS was rated as useful in aiding visual contact (mean=7.3). (See
question 9.)
The evasive maneuvers prescribed by TCAS were rated 7.7 on a 10-point scale from unacceptable to
acceptable. Pilots rated their satisfaction with the TCAS as 7.6. See appendix S for the mean pilot
ratings of the TCAS in general, its use, and the various components of the system.
28. Were pilots accurate in the estimate of their reaction time to the TCAS maneuver advisory?
Pilots were asked to estimate their reaction time in responding to a maneuver advisory. The average
estimated time to initiate a maneuver was 3.2 see. The measured mean reaction time was 1.9 see, an
average difference of 1.3 see. The differences between the estimated and actual reaction times differed
significantly 0"--2.42, df=44, p<.05) and were not correlated.
29. With tr_Ofc automatically presented only during a conflict, how often did pilots use the traffic
switch to enable the display?
The pilots who were presented traffic location information only during a conflict were able to show the
three top priority aircraft at any time by toggling a switch on the transponder/rCAS panel. Crews fre-
quently used this function after receiving an ATC traffic advisory, as an instance. The display, would
become active for 15 see each time this switch was selected. Sometimes crews would display the
traffic for 15 see and immediately display it again. When the display was enabled sequentially in this
manner, it was counted as a multiple use. Crew 1 displayed the traffic 54 times with nine multiples.
Crew 2 used this display option 19 times including two sequential selections. The third crew used the
traffic display selector 16 times. Twice, there were double selections. Crew 4 toggled the display
switch the most, with 91 display presentations and 17 multiples.
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The pilots who had traffic presented only during a traffic conflict were asked to rate the usefulness of
the option to display the most important targets. The mean rating was 7.8, with a standard deviation of
2.1 on a 10-point scale.
30. How did pilots having continuously displayed traffic information use the options for the traffic
display ranges?
The four crews having continuous traffic information were able to select the range of traffic to be
displayed to either 3, 5, 10, or 20 nautical miles. Table 10 shows the usage of this range option.
They could also select the vertical range for. up 7000 and down 2700 ft (above), up and down 2700
(off), or up 2700 and down 7000 ft (below). Table 11 shows the ranges selected by the four crews.
For a description of the suggested use of these options see the training video narrative (appendix D).
TABLE 10. USE OF THE HORIZONTAL DISPLAY RANGE OPTIONS
(Data for four crews, approximately 6-hr flight time each)
Average Maximum Average
Number duration duration altitude Percentage
Range of times at each of range at time of of total
setting selected range selection selection time
(min;seg) (min:se¢) (f-t3
3 11 1:05 5:46 10400 1.1
5 43 2:38 24:42 9640 10.8
10 80 5:43 36:24 11136 44.8
20 58 7:40 49:36 12388 43.3
TABLE 11. USE OF THE VERTICAL RANGE OPTIONS
Average Maximum Average
Number duration duration altitude Percentage
Vertical of times at each of range at time of of total
setting selected range selection selection time
(rain;see) (hr:min:sec_ (ft_
Above 50 1:52 0:17:25 17449 12.7
Below 52 1:27 0:10:56 21261 9.4
Off 71 8:40 1:43:57 18619 77.9
The flight level switch converted the relative altitudes of the traffic to their altitude above sea level.
This option was selected 7 times by the 4 crews, averaging 1.75 times per crew. Crew 1 selected the
flight level switch 0 times, crew 2 once, crew 3 twice, and crew 4 four times.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is known from many simulation experiments, and from the use of fuU-mission simulation for line-
oriented flight training, that pilots (and especially air carrier pilots) may behave differently under simu-
lated flight conditions than they would in the real world. It is also known, however, that if efforts are
made to construct a simulation realistically, the behavior of most pilots approaches their usual behavior
in actual flight operations. This is most likely to be true if crew members perceive themselves as not
under direct or continuous observation.
In this simulation experiment, everything possible was done to minimize the intrusiveness of the exper-
imental situation. No observers were ever present in the cockpit; interactions with flight crews were
only those normal to line flying. Every effort was made, on the other hand, to provide crews with all
of the interactions with ATC, company, and ground crews that they normally would encounter during
routine operations. Based on crew comments during debriefing, these efforts were largely effective.
Nonetheless, the results of this experiment must be interpreted cautiously. While there were periods of
over an hour without traffic conflicts, the crews were exposed to 6 times as many traffic advisories and
over 20 times as many maneuver advisories as have been experienced in line flying. They knew that
TCAS, and specifically their responses to the system, were under investigation, and they knew, of
course, that conflicting traffic posed no actual danger to them.
Bearing in mind these limitations of this (or any other) simulation experiment, the authors believe that
certain observations can be made and certain conclusions drawn from the data collected during this
study.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Within the conditions of this experiment, the TCAS II traffic alert and collision-avoidance system, as
implemented, was entirely successful in ameliorating the seriousness of the traffic conflicts presented to
flight crews. The twelve crews flying with TCAS had no conflicts involving a point of closest
approach of less than 1000 ft vertically and 200 ft horizontally; three of four crews flying without
TCAS experienced such conflicts.
The amount of information on the location of other traffic had little effect on the pilots' performance of
the maneuvers commanded by the collision-avoidance system. Measured crew responses were similar
without information regarding traffic location, with limited traffic information, and with continuous
traffic information. The only measure which showed any difference associated with the level of traffic
information was peak vertical velocity overshoot. These peaks were not associated with differences in
root mean square velocity overshoot and did not produce differences in the amount of altitude displace-
ment during the maneuvers.
Seven of eight crews provided with a planform display of waffle information used that information at
least once to maneuver in advance of receiving a maneuver advisory, despite instructions not to do so
(discussed in detail during their training and which they understood, as indicated by their comments in
flight). The use of the traffic display to maneuver prior to receiving a resolution advisory must be
addressed in TCAS training programs. The training must encourage pilots to use all the information
available to them to maintain a safe distance from other aircraft, but the inaccuracy of bearing and alti-
tude information on traffic advisory displays must be emphasized. The likelihood that anticipatory
avoidance maneuvers may compromise the performance of the TCAS in computing the most effective
avoidance maneuver should also be discussed in training. Pilots must learn to use the system the way
the designers and its logic intend it to be used, though they also must remember to use their training
and experience to evaluate situations and take appropriate action to ensure safety of flight.
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Three turning maneuvers were made to avoid unseen aircraft with transponders but without altitude
reporting capability (mode A transponders). Crew comments during these maneuvers indicated that
they were aware that their instructions were not to make such maneuvers, but that they were also
aware that no resolution or avoidance maneuvers could be generated by TCAS due to the lack of infor-
mation about the altitude of the intruder aircraft. The uncertainty caused in the cockpit by incomplete
information about such targets suggests the need for mode C (altitude reporting) transponding equip-
ment in all aircraft likely to interact with TCAS-equipped aircraft, especially in terminal areas where
aircrew and air traffic controller workload is especially high.
The lack of apparent learning effects in this experiment may be due to the limited number of
maneuvers performed by the individual pilots and the crews as a whole. There also may be a con-
founding effect of fatigue, since duty days were approximately 10 hr, with 8 segments and 6-hr flight
time.
The measures of flight experience which differed across display conditions, Boeing 727 flight time and
recent flight time, did not manifest themselves in pilot performance. Therefore, display condition
effects were independent of flight crew experience level within the limited range studied.
These results, obtained in a full-crew, full-mission environment, may be representative of how flight
crews will behave when the traffic alert and collision-avoidance system is introduced. The findings
also have fundamental importance with respect to information transfer issues in today's and future air-
craft. TCAS is a fairly intelligvat system; it represents one of the first "smart" systems to be intro-
duced into air carrier line operations. For that reason, it will be important to observe, in detail, how
flight crews utilize and interact with it so that the lessons learned can be applied to the design of other
"smart" systems now under development, and to the interfaces through which such systems will
interact with flight crews.
In this limited experiment, the presence of TCAS conveyed marked and significant benefits in terms of
safety. Significant additional benefits from the presence of planform displays of other traffic were not
observed in this study, though this must be further evaluated in flight during the TCAS limited installa-
tion program.
REFERENCES
Boucek, G.P. Jr.; Pfaff, T.A.; White, R.W. and Smith, W.D.: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System; Operational Simulation, Final Report DOT/FAA/PM-85/10, Boeing Commercial Airplane
Company, Seattle, March, 1985.
Hart, S.G.; and Staveland, L.E.: Development of a Multi-Dimensional Workload Rating Scale: Results
of Empirical and Theorelical Research. In P.A. Hancock & N. Meshkati eds., Human Mental Work-
load. Amsterdam, Netherlands, Elsevier Press, to be published.
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics: Minimum Operation Performance Standards for the
Traffic-Alert and Collision System (TCAS) (Airborne Equipment), RTCA/DO-185, Prepared by Com-
mittee SC-147. Washington, D.C., September, 1983.
Shively, R.J.; Battiste, V.; Matsumoto, J.; Pepitone, D.D.; Bortolussi, M.R.; and Hart, S.G.: lnflight
Evaluation of Pilot Workload Measures for Rotorcraft Research. Proc. 4th Annual Symposium on
Aviation Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, April 1987.
28
- 17i[ 17
Society of Automotive Engineers: Human Engineering Issues for the Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System. AIR 4034, Developed by SAE G-10 TCAS Subcommittee. Warminster, PA,
October, 1987.
Tuttell, R.J.: Human Factors Aspects of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS-II).
Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March, 1988.
Womack, F. D.: Initial Observations on the Operational Evaluation of TCAS-H Industry Prototype.
Proceedings of Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee's (AEEC) Imemational Technical Confer-
ence on TCAS Implementation. AEEC Letter 87-176/XPDR-87, Washington, DC, December, 1987.
29
_4alork_ _o"at_CS ano
._,_ e Ac_i,_
1. Report No,
NASA TM- 100094
4. Titleand Subtitle
Report Documentation Page
2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No,
5, Report Date
Pilots' Use of a Traffic Alert and Collision-
Avoidance System (TCAS II) in Simulated Air Carrier
Operations
Volume I. Methodology, Stmmmry and Conclusions
7. Author(s}
Sheryl L. Chappell, Charles E. Billings, Barry C.
Scott,* Robert _. Tuttell,** M. Christine Olsen,
Thomas E. Kozon"
9. Pedo_ingOrgan_zationNameendAddrees
Ames Research Center
Hoffett Field, CA 94035
7_
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
January 1989
6. Performing Organization Code
8. Pedorming Organizatmn Re_rt No.
A-88140
10. Work Unit No,
505-67-41
11. Contract or Grant No.
13. Ty_ of Re_rt and Period Covered
Technical Memorandum
14. Sponloring Agency Code
15, SupldernenmW Not_
Point of Contact: Karen McNally, Ames Research Center, MS 239-21
Moffett Field, CA 94035 (415) 694-6128 or FTS 464-6128
*Federal Aviat$on Administration, Moffett Field, CA; **Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA; Sterling Software Corporation, Palo Alto, CA. "
16. Abstract
Pilots' use of and responses to a traffic alert and collision-avoidance system (TCAS II) In simu-
lated air carrier line operations are described in Volume I. TCAS II monitors the positions of nearby
aircraft by means of transponder interrogation, and it coa_ands a climb or descent when conflicting
aircraft are projected to reach an unsafe closest-point-of-approach within 20-25 seconds. A different
level of information about the location of other air traffic was presented to each of three groups of
flight crews during their execution of eight simulated air carrier flights. A fourth group of pilots
flew the same segments without TCAS II equipment. Traffic conflicts were generated at intervals during
the flights; many of the conflict aircraft were visible to the flight crews.
The TCAS equipment successfully ameliorated the seriousness of all conflicts; three of four non-
TCAS crews had hazardous encounters. Response times to TCAZ maneuver commands did not differ as a func-
tion of the amount of information provided, nor did response accuracy. Differences in flight experience
did not appear to contribute to the small performance differences observed. Pilots used the displays of
conflicting traffic to maneuver to avoid unseen traffic before maneuver advisories were issued by the
TCAS equipment. The results indicate (I) that pilots utilize TCA_ effectively within the response times
allocated by the TCAS logic and (2) that TCAS II is an effective collision avoidance device.
Volume II contains the appendices referenced in Volume I, providing details of the ezperiment and
the results, and the text of two reports written in support of the program.
17. Key Wo_s (Suggested by Authorls))
Collision-avoidance systems; TCAS;
Pilot performance; Human factors;
Information transfer; Displays
19. Security Cla_if. (of this repot)
Unclassified
20. Security Classif. (of this
Unclassified
18, Distribution Statement
Unclassified-Unlimited
Subject Category - 54
page) 21. No. of pages
4]
NASA FORM 16_ OCT 86 For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161
22. Price
A03
:l-I 1"
